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IN THE NAME OF FOOD SECURITY: THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND
FAILURES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE BALI
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
CHINGWEN HSUEH*

I. INTRODUCTION
According to the 2013 estimate of the Food and Agriculture Organization,
842 million people suffered from chronic hunger in 2011-2013.1 In other words,
approximately one out of every eight people in the world is undernourished.
Developing countries account for most of these people, 827 million in total. 2 The
international community is highly aware of the famine and numerous international
organizations, including the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), exert efforts to
solve the problem from their perspective. According to the preamble of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO
Agreement"), trade is not an end in itself but rather a means of "raising standards
of living." 3 Furthermore, members of the WTO noted nontrade concerns in the
preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture ("AoA"), including:
food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to
the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing
countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into
account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the
reform programme 4 on least-developed and net food-importing
developing countries.
In addition, Article 20 of the AoA emphasizes that there is much to
accomplish to complete the reform of agricultural trade, which considers food
security. 5 These provisions show that the WTO considers food security essential
in the trade legal system, especially in developing countries. Additional attention
on food security in liberalizing the trade of foodstuffs can be assumed.

* Assistant Professor, School of Law, National Chiao Tung University. Dr. iur., University of Cologne,
Germany. Email:chingwenhsueh@nctu.edu.tw
1. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. ("FAO"), UN. World Food Programme ("WFP"), & Int'l Fundfor
Agric. Dev. ("IFAD"), The State of Food Insecurity in the World 8 (FAO 2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf. Note that this was a projection, but a decrease from
the number in 2008-10.
2. Id.
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement],
https://www.wto.org/english/res_efbookspe/agrmntseries Iwtoe.pdf.
4. Marrakesh Agreement, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-Agreement
on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/14ag.pdf [hereinafter AoA].
5 Id. at art. 20.
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The Doha Development Agenda ("DDA") was established to provide a
framework to avoid the negative effects of free trade on food security in
developing countries. 6 However, fruitless and endless negotiations cause the
objective of the DDA to seem more an illusion than a possibility. The setback of
the "draft modalities" 7 in 2008 rendered the DDA even further from achieving its
aim. In 2013, the opportunity to complete the DDA reemerged in the Bali
Ministerial Conference. After five days of intensive discussions, the ministers of
members adopted the decisions known as the "Bali Package," which was a result
of the United States trading food security proposals for the Agreement on Trade
Facilitation. 8 The decisions concerning agriculture primarily followed the draft
proposed by developing countries. 9 In other words, the Bali declaration and
decisions concerning agriculture considered more needs of developing countries
than those of developed countries.
This study assesses the extent of which the Bali Package can ensure food
security in developing countries. Part II presents a discussion on the policy options
for developing countries to ensure food security. The discussion focuses on the
adverse effect on other developing countries and attempts to determine the policies
that contribute to food security at the global level. Part III presents an analysis the
implication of the WTO rules on food security and identifies the concerns of
developing countries. Part IV presents an examination of the improvement that the
Bali Package can contribute to the food security in developing countries and the
world. A preliminary observation of whether developing countries have achieved
food security in trade is provided in the conclusion.
II. POLICY

ORIENTATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO ACHIEVE FOOD SECURITY

Determining the needs of developing countries for achieving food security is
difficult because of two reasons. First, the concept of food security has evolved
constantly in previous decades, reflecting the changes in the considerations for
food security, which involves more than mere famine. 10 An effective strategy for
food security should solve numerous concerns such as those of hunger, economic

6. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 13, WT/MN(01)/DEC/1, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl_e.htm.
7. WTO Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalitiesfor Agriculture,
TN/AGIW/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/agrice/agchairtxtdec08_ae.pdf.
8. See Christian Hliberli, After Bali: WTO Rules Applying to Public Food Reserves 7 (prepared
for the Expert meeting on reserves/stocks and specifically their potential role in market/price
stabilization from 30-31 Jan. 2014) (last visited Mar. 31, 2015),
http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/userupload/wti.org/news/140130-Haeberli-Stockpiles-Final forFAO.
pdf.
9. See Briefing note: Agriculture negotiations-thebid to 'harvest' some 'lowhangingfruit',9th
WTO Ministerial Conference, BALI, 2013 (2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/mc9_e/brief-agnege.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
10. See FAO COMMODITIES AND TRADE DIvISION, TRADE REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY:
CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKAGES 25-26 (2003), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4671 e/y467I eOO.pdf
[hereinafter FAO, TRADE REFORMS].
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development, and the environment. Prioritizing all the various concerns of food
security might be difficult for developing countries. Second, food security is not
defined at a single level but can be defined at different levels such as the
household, national, and global level." I Food security at one level does not
guarantee it at another level. Moreover, the strategy for food security in one
country might have a negative spillover effect in another. For instance, a country
in a food crisis might impose an export restriction on a produce, causing the world
price of that product to increase and putting poor countries that rely on imported
food at risk. The conflicts of interests among developing countries regarding food
security are not uncommon. In addition, a unilateral strategy might not be
effective without the cooperation of other countries. For the common good,
pursuing food security at both national and global levels instead of only at the
national level is preferable.
A.

The definition offood security

The term "food security" was first mentioned in the mid-1970s when the
World Food Conference was held to discuss the global food crisis. The focus was
on food supply and the price stability of foodstuffs at international and national
levels. 12 The conference defined food security as the "availability at all times of
adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs ...to sustain a steady expansion of
food consumption in countries with low levels of per capita intake and to offset
fluctuations in production and prices."' 13 In the 1980s, the Food and Agriculture
Organization ("FAO") emphasized the importance of access to food, which was
defined in the following goal: "all people at all times have both physical and
4
economic access to the basic food that they need."' In 1986, the World Bank
Report on Poverty and Hunger focused on the temporal dynamics of food security.5
insecurity.
The report differentiated chronic food insecurity from transitory food
Chronic food insecurity is associated with the problem of continuing or structural
poverty and low incomes; transitory food insecurity refers to situations of
16
intensified pressure caused by natural disasters. Food security in general was
defined as an "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and

11. Panos Konandreas, Trade and Food Security: Options for Developing Countries 10.2.1, in
FAO, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE MANUAL, Module 10

(2000), http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7353e/x7353e10.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
12. Edward Clay, Food Security: Concepts and Measurement 1 (2002) (paper for FAO Expert
Linkages),
the
Conceptualizing
Security:
Food
and
Trade
on
Consultation
http://ieham.org/html/docs/food_securityconcepts-and-measurement.pdf.
13. World Food Conference, Rome, Italy, Nov. 5-16, 1974, Res. XVII, E/CONF.65/20 (1975).
14. FAO, Director General's Report, World Food Security: a Reappraisalof the Concepts and
Approaches (1983).
15.

WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER:

ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY IN

http://www1986)
31,
(July
1
COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/17/000178830_981019014
55676/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
16. Id.
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healthy life."
The most widely accepted definition of food security was provided in the
World Food Summit, 1996. According to the World Food Summit Plan of Action,
"[flood security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food
8
preferences for an active and healthy life.'
The concept of food security comprises four dimensions: food availability,
access to food, utilization, and stability. Food availability refers to "[t]he
availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through
domestic production or imports."' 19 Access to food refers to the "[a]ccess by
individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring appropriate foods for
a nutritious diet., 20 Stability exists when "population[s], household[s] or
individual[s] ... have access to adequate food at all times.",21 The concept of
stability overlaps with the concepts of food availability and access to food, except
that stability focuses on the risks of losing food availability or access as the
consequences of sudden crises or cyclical events. Utilization is defined as
"[u]tilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care
to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met.", 22
According to this definition, nonfood aspects enhance the concept of food security,
which aims for not only the survival of human beings but also for healthy lives.
B. Increasingfood availability
Food availability concerns the quantities of foodstuffs, which are determined
by supply and demand. Generally, food insecurity at the global level is caused
more by the lack of access to food than by an insufficient supply of food.23 Food
insecurity regarding food quantities at the national level can be alleviated by trade
or food aids. In other words, enough food is available for everyone, but not
everyone can afford the price. However, the world is not guaranteed food
availability because of the potential increase of food demand and the uncertainty of
the food supply. The demand of food is expected to increase because of the
population and income growth of developing countries.24 The increased income
will raise the per capita calorie demand in developing countries to higher than a

17. Id. at V.
18. World Food Summit, Rome, Italy, Nov. 13-17, 1996, Rome Declaration on World Food
Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action,
1, WFS 96/REP (Nov. 17, 1996),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e0O.HTM.
19. FAO,

2

POLICY

BRIEF

ON

FOOD

SECURITY

1,

1

(June

2006),

ftp://fitp.fao.org/es/ESA/policybriefs/pbO2.pdf [hereinafter FAO POLICY BRIEF].
20. Id.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Amartya Sen, Famines, 8 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 613, 614 (1980).

24. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ("OECD"), Trade & Agric. Directorate, Global Food
Security: Challengesfor The Food and Agriculture System
(Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter OECD, Global Food Security].

69, TAD/CA/APM/WP(2012) 18/FINAL
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healthy level.25 According to these two factors, the global agricultural production
should increase substantially, at least by sixty percent compared with 2005-2007.26
However, increasing the food supply is challenging because of climate change.
Although the negative effect of climate change on agriculture is difficult to
27
estimate, the risk of increased food price is evident.
To ensure food availability, developing countries should either limit the food
demand or increase the food supply. Developing countries have lower productivity
than that of developed countries. The yield gap can be closed by changing farm
sizes, improving management capacity, increasing access to input and output
markets, and increasing the effectiveness of input use. Improving productivity
29
technological development,
requires national investment in agricultural research,
and agricultural education, which enables farmers to manage their farms and
outputs efficiently. In addition, expanding the land for agricultural use sustainably
can increase the supply of food. However, little or no room is found for the
30
expansion of arable land. Arable lands are also subject to nonagricultural uses,
pollution, and erosion. 3 1 Economic incentives are believed to resolve these
problems to some extent.
Much can be achieved toward reducing the excessive food demand, such as
minimizing supply-chain losses, biofuel consumption, and consumer wastes.
Developing countries have considerable food losses because2 of poor storage
3
facilities, inadequate infrastructure, and weak technical ability. Government and
private sectors are suggested to invest in the general infrastructure, harvest
33
Governments, especially those of developed
techniques, and storage facilities.
countries, should remove the subsidies for biofuels, which are composed of raw
25. See FAO, WFP, & IFAD, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 17 (FAO 2012),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf.
26. Sen, supranote 23.
27. See Gerlad Nelson et. al., The Role of InternationalTrade in Climate Change Adaptation,
ICTSD-IPC PLATFORM ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

AGRICULTURE AND TRADE

8-9

(Dec.

2009),

4

http://www.agritrade.org/documents/IssueBrief .pdf.
28. Sen, supra note 23, at 27.
29. See Robert E. Evenson & Keith 0. Fuglie, Technology Capital: The PriceofAdmission to the
Growth Club, 33 J. PROD. ANAL.173, 189 (2009).
30. See generally Nikos Alexandratos & Jelle Bruinsma, World Agriculture Towards 2030/2050:
The 2012 revision, ESA Working Paper No. 12-03, FAO, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DIVISION (June 2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/esa/
2 3
Global_persepctives/worldag_ 0 0_50_2012_rev.pdf; Gilnther Fischer, WorldFood andAgriculture
and Bioenergy Alter the Long-term Outlookfor Food,Agriculture
Change
Climate
Do
How
to 2030/50:
and ResourceAvailability? (presented at the FAO Expert Meeting on How to Feed the World in 2050,
June 24-26, 2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/O12/ak972e/ak972eOO.pdf.
31. Sen, supranote 23, at 30.
CAUSES
32. See JENNY GUSTAVSSON ET AL., GLOBAL FOOD LOSSES AND FOOD WASTE: EXTENT,

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/suistainability/
(2011),
11
PREVENTION
AND
pdf/GlobalFoodLosses andFoodWaste.pdf.

AND
33. See GOV'T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE FUTURE OF FOOD AND FARMING: CHALLENGES
2011),
(London,
89
REPORT
PROJECT
FINAL
SUSTAINABiLITY,
GLOBAL
FOR
CHOICES

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/288329/1 1-546-futureof-food-and-farming-report.pdf.
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materials competing with food.34 Regarding consumer wastes, developed countries
have a substantial responsibility to raise public awareness through campaigns and
advertising. 35
In brief, developing countries can contribute to food availability by investing
in agricultural research and development ("R&D"), general infrastructure,
education, and the preservation of arable lands.
C. Ensuring access to food
Assuming that the quantities of food remain sufficient for the global demand,
access to food is the primary cause of food insecurity. 36 Access to food is limited
37
because of low income or high food prices, rather than an insufficient supply.
Food aids can provide access to food; however, dependence on the courtesy of the
international community is not reliable in the long term. Two intuitive options
exist for developing countries: (1) reduce food prices or (2) increase incomes.
Suppressing food prices can secure access for consumers, but reducing producers'
income limits their access to food and reduces their incentive to invest in
production. A mutually beneficial strategy is to increase incomes in developing
countries, particularly the incomes of people living in rural areas.
In numerous developing countries, the agricultural sector causes growth and
developments in other sectors. Increasing the incomes in agricultural sectors might
be the most feasible way to reduce poverty. To achieve this, the competitiveness
of farmers must be improved; this requires investments that are specific to the
agricultural sector for research, infrastructure, and human capital.38 In addition,
diversifying the sources of incomes of farm households is an effective coping
strategy. The earnings outside the agricultural sector could be higher and more
stable. Moreover, policies must create opportunities outside the agricultural sector
for the farmers who cannot have a competitive future in this sector, and for those
who can earn more in other sectors. 39 In addition to the reforms for economic,
social protection can be provided to support access to food by protecting incomes
and increasing food security in the short term.4 ° Price support and input subsidies,
although prevalent in numerous countries, are ineffective at raising incomes. 41
Similar to improving food availability, investments in the agricultural sector
can increase incomes and therefore ensure access to food. The social security net
can support access to food in the short term.

34. Sen, supranote 24, at 33.
35. See GUsTAvsSON ETAL., supra note 33, at 14.
36. See FAO POLICY BRIEF, supra note 19, at 1.
37. See id. at 4.
38. See OECD, Policy Framework for Investment in Agriculture 1, 4 (Mar. 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/PFIAApri12013.pdf.
39. See Sen, supranote 23, at 63-64.
40. See Jonathan Brooks, Policy Coherence and Food Security: The Effects of OECD Countries'
AgriculturalPolicies, 44 FOOD POLICY 88, 93 (2014).
41. See OECD, MARKET EFFECTS OF CROP SUPPORT MEASURES 1, 32 (2001).
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D. Maintainingstability
The concept of stability focuses on the temporal dimension of food security.
The concerns with stability are the risks of losing food availability or access
because of sudden crises or cyclical events. The policy orientations of developing
countries are to increase the resilience to price volatility and the short-term
shortage of food supply. Several options exist; the first is trade liberalization.
Instability occurs mostly at the domestic level, and trade can be a stabilizing
mechanism.42 Compared with the agricultural output of individual countries, the
world output is substantially less variable; therefore, international trade can
maintain balance in global supply fluctuations. Some countries do not accept this
perception and fear that relying on trade would expose the domestic market to the
vagaries of the world market.43 However, analysis revealed the opposite: small
volumes of trade in agricultural products can cause increased price volatility at the
global level, because a small variation in supply can have a substantial impact on
44
the market as a result of a large share of world trade. For example, a two percent
decline in milled rice production constituted twenty-eight percent of the world
trade of rice in 2010. 4 5 The impact on volatility would have been magnified if
46
there were a concentration on market suppliers. Furthermore, trade restriction
can be ineffective at protecting the domestic price from the negative impacts of
47
world price volatility and can only transfer the risk to others; therefore, trade
restriction is a typical beggar-thy-neighbor policy. To utilize trade for food
security, reducing import barriers and trade-distorting domestic supports and
48
prohibiting export subsidies are recommended.
The second option for reducing price volatility is to provide transparency of
market information. Information on the current and future market situations can
substantially assist the market in functioning efficiently. Providing timely and
49
accurate data on food production, consumption, and stocks is suggested. The
third option is that future markets provide instruments to transfer the risk of
volatility and attract financial investors who are not in the agricultural
commodities market. Although speculators can have a negative impact on
42. Phil Abbott, StabilisationPolicies in Developing Countries after the 2007-08 Food Crisis, in
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 109, 157(Jonathan Brooks ed., 2012).
43. See FAO, TRADE REFORMS, supranote 110, at 128.

44. See Sen, supra note 23, at 48.
45. Jonathan Brooks & Alan Matthews, Agricultural Trade and Food Security: Choosing
Between Trade And Non-Trade Policy Instruments, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1, 22, http://www.ictsdsymposium.org/wp-content/uploads/bsk-pdfmanager/ 3 lBrooks-Matthews-Trade-Policy-and-Food-Security.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Will Martin & Kymn Anderson, Export Restrictions and Price Insulation During
Commodity Price Booms, 94 (2) AM. J. AGR. ECON. 422, 426-27 (2012).
48. FAO et al., Price Volatility in FoodandAgriculturalMarkets. Policy Responses 1, 26 (2011),
http://www.amisoutlook.org/fileadmin/templates/AMIS/dcuments/InteragencyReport-to-the G20_onFoodPrice_V
olatility.pdf.
49. See id. at 21.
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stability, an appropriate regulatory scheme can ensure the function of future
markets as intended in terms of hedging and price discovering.50 The fourth option
is to use food stocks as a buffer for the adverse effect of volatility. Food stocks are
more prevalent in developing countries than developed countries despite the high
expenditure caused by the cost of appropriate storage infrastructure and of
purchasing foodstuffs.5' Compared with public food stocks, private food stocks
are believed to be more efficient.52 To encourage the investment in private
stocking in developing countries, providing credits for storage improvements by
the private sector is recommended. 3 To encourage the investment in private
stocking in developing countries, providing credits for storage improvements by
the private sector is recommended. 54 Emergency reserves and social safety nets
are both fair options for helping those who are most vulnerable to price volatility in
the short term. 5
Finally, risk management is the long-term option to cope with the volatility.
Risk management primarily involves three types of activities, namely mitigation of
the risk, transfer of the risk, and coping with the impact of the realized risk.56 For
instance, a drought risk can be avoided using drought-resistant seeds. Insurance
and derivatives can assist farmers in transferring the risks to a third party. Disaster
57
risk financing provides ex ante protection for those affected by the realized risks.
In developing countries, farmers with smaller businesses and even the
governments might not have the knowledge, assets, technology, and financial
instruments for risk management. Governments of developing countries and
private sectors should be provided with assistance in facilitating commodity
hedging, advisory services to strengthen in-country financial risk management
capacity, 58disaster risk financing, and assistance in modernizing meteorological
services.
E. Improving the utilization offood
The utilization of food focuses on the "state of nutritional wellbeing." 9 This
emphasizes the nutritional quality of diets and healthy food consumption.
Increasing the food supply or incomes cannot guarantee the utilization of food.
Cost-effective and efficient options are nutrition-specific interventions such as
information and education programs, the provision of health care services, and
clean water and sanitation infrastructures.60

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 22.
See id.
at 28.
See id.
at 29.
See id.
at 29.
See id.
See id.
at 30, 65.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 36.

59. FAO POLICY BRIEF, supranote 19, at 1.
60. See GOV'T OFFICE FOR SC., supra note 33, at 116.

2015

IN THE NAME OF FOOD SECURITY

In summary, three policy orientations exist that can contribute to food
security. First, poverty is the primary cause of food insecurity in developing
countries. Increasing the incomes of individuals can substantially secure access to
food. Second, regarding productivities, governments and the private sector are
encouraged to invest in agricultural R&D, education, and the rural institutional
environment. Third, additional resources should be deployed for the availability of
risk management tools.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WTO RULES ON FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

It is generally agreed that trade has a substantial impact, whether positive or
negative, on food security at national and global levels. Ideal trade rules can
increase the positive effects of trade and mitigate its negative effects on food
security. 61 The bottom line is that trade rules are to not prevent countries from
taking measures to ensure food security, such as the aforementioned strategies.
Trade in agriculture is closely associated with food security, a concern with
nontrade factors; therefore, trade in agriculture is different from the trade in other
sectors. The AoA provides the legal framework of trade in agriculture, which aims
6
to establish "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system." ' This
objective is pursued through "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural
support and protection." 63 The AoA comprises three essentials, namely market64
subsidies.
access, reductions in domestic support, and reductions in export
Supplementing the AoA, the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least65
Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries ("NFIDC decision") is
part of the legal framework. Another relevant provision is Article XI: 2(a) of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), which established an
66
exemption for the prohibition of export restrictions. This section examines the
implication of the WTO rules on food security in developing countries and their
concerns.
A.

Market access

The AoA requires members to convert all nontariff trade barriers ("NTBs")
67
Furthermore, the tariffs, which converted from the NTBs, shall be
into tariffs.

61. FAO, Foodand InternationalTrade, 3.4,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w2612e/w2612e12.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
62. AoA, supra note 4, at pmbl.
63. Id.
64. Id. at arts. 3 and 4.
65. Decision on Measures Concerningthe Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme
on Least-Developedand Net Food-ImportingDeveloping Countries,Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement, at 60 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Decision on Measures].
66. GATT 1994, art. XI, para. 2(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
67. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 4(2).
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progressively reduced over the course of six years (1995-2000). The obligations
of developed countries are to reduce the tariffs by an average of thirty-six percent
and by fifteen percent for each tariff line, 68 whereas the minimum reduction rate
for developing countries are an average of twenty-four percent and ten percent for
each tariff line. 69 The amount of reductions is provided with precise percentages in
the members' individual tariff schedules. 70 To prevent the high tariffs converted
from the NTBs that might preserve or even further constrain the market access,
members are required to maintain the current market access or to provide the
minimum market access. 71 The current market opportunity must not be less than
the average annual import quantities for 1986-1988.72 Where there were no
significant imports, minimum market access opportunity is provided by the tariff
rate quotas ("TRQs"). The TRQs are applied to imports equivalent to five percent
of the domestic consumption in the base period of 1986-1988. 73 Because the
special safeguard provision does not require an "injury test," it provides members
more flexibility compared with the safeguard in Article XIX of GATT.74 The
requirement for the special safeguards is the trigger amount of imports or the
75
trigger price of imports and is less strict than that for ordinary safeguards.
However, the measures adopted under the special safeguard provision include no
quantitative restrictions.
As mentioned in the previous section, open markets can contribute to food
security in developing countries in two ways. First, importing products in demand
increases the availability of foods. Second, exporting agricultural products
increases incomes and therefore secures access to food. However, the AoA does
not guarantee fully open domestic markets. Committed members open their
domestic markets, but the extent of openness depends primarily on the willingness
of the members. In reality, the implementations of market access are criticized to
be disadvantageous for developing countries. Developing countries are provided
with limited market access to developed countries because developed countries
have adopted "dirty tariffication" that overestimate the tariff equivalences of
NTBs. 76 In addition, the obligation of tariff reductions for developed countries are
68. GATT Secretariat, Modalitiesfor The Establishmentof Specific Binding Commitments under
the Reform Programme, 5, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 (Dec. 20,1993).
69. ,Paola Fortucci, An Overview of the International Trade Policy Frameworkfor Sugar, FAO
Cuba Conference (1999), http://www.fao.org/3/a-x4988e/x4988e08.htm (Last visited April 19, 2014).
70. Ian Sturgess, The LiberalisationProcess in InternationalAgricultural Trade: Market Access
and Export Subsidies, in NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: AGRICULTURAL
TRADE AND THE MILLENNIUM WTO ROUND 135, 147 (Sanoussi Bilal & Pavlos Pezaros eds., 2000).
71. Id.

72. Decision on Measures, supra note 65, Annex 3, at 430.
73. Song Soo Lim & Ronald A. Babula, How Much is it Worth to Protect Sensitive Products with
Tariff-Rate Quotas- A Korean Case, 35 J. RURAL DEV. 83, 87 (2012).
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4, at
19-20; Dale E. Hathaway & Merlinda D. Ingco,
Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND AND DEVELOPING
ECONOMIES, 307 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 15, 24 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds.,
1995).
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set at an average of thirty-six percent, with a minimum fifteen percent reduction
for each tariff line. 7 This modality enables the members to minimize the tariff
reduction of their most valued products, which are likely those produced or
Moreover, there were and still are
consumed domestically in large amounts.
tariff escalations in several vital product chains; 79 which could cause the foods
produced in developing countries to be less competitive in price, thereby impeding
their development. Furthermore, the minimum market access is modest and does
not require any imports. The members are not required to open their market to
new entrants because they can use the existing agreement of commodities on
concessionary terms, such as the agreements between the EU and ACP countries
on sugar parchments, to satisfy the requirement of the minimum market. 80 Finally,
some developed countries abuse the special safeguards by setting a trigger price
higher than that provided in the AoA. 81 Most agricultural products in developed
countries are subject to the special safeguard provision, which is easily abused8.
Compared with developed countries, developing countries have adopted an
open attitude toward imports. The applied tariff rates are approximately fourfold
lower than the bound rates.83 Developing countries maintain this gap not merely
because they are cautious about committing large tariff cuts. A more substantial
reason is that they do not find maintaining high domestic food prices to be
politically feasible because of a large poor population, or that foreign loans are
conditional on low applied rates. 84 If developed countries remain parsimonious
be disadvantaged
about the market access, developing countries would continue to
85
and thus lose the opportunity to increase incomes from exports.
B.

Export subsidies

Export subsidies are proven to distort trade and are prohibited except for trade
in agricultural products. The AoA prohibits the export subsidies, which are subject
to a reduction obligation, but it did not exist during the base period (1986-1990).86
77. Joseph F. Francois et al., Assessing the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND AND
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 307 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 140,150-51 (Will Martin & L. Alan

Winters eds., 1995).
78. See Paper No. 4: Issues at Stake Relating to Agricultural Development, Trade and Food
Security,
27 (Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security) (Sept.1999),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x4829e/x4829e04.htm#TopOfPage [hereinafter Paper No. 4].
79. See id. at 28.
80. Joseph Francois et al., supra note 77, at 137.
81. AoA, supranote 4, art. 5.
82. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
FoodSecurity, andDeveloping Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL L.433, 463 (2002).
83. See FAO Commodities & Trade Division, Implementation ofAoA and other WTO
agreements, in WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: THE IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE-

DEVELOPING COUNTRY CASE STUDIES, tbl. 3 (2003),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4632e/y4632e04.htm#bmO4 [hereinafter FA0, Implementation of

AoA].
84. See id§ 2.1.
85. See OECD, GlobalFood Security, supra note 24, at

86. AoA, supranote 4, at art. 3(3).
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Certain amounts of export subsidies are permissible. The AoA requires developed
countries to reduce the expenditures for export subsidies by thirty-six percent of
those expended in the base period, and to reduce the quantities of subsidized
exports by twenty-one percent. 87 According to the special and different treatment,
developing countries are provided with the leniency of reduction levels of twentyfour percent and fourteen percent, respectively. The implementation period is
extended to ten years, which is four years longer than that allowed for developed
countries. 88 In addition, reduction obligations are limited to six types of export
subsidies. 89 Although members can adopt the export subsidies not listed in the
AoA, they should be applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to
reduction obligations. Neither should food aid be used to
lead to, circumvention of 90
disguise export subsidies.
The requirements for export subsidies are insufficient to mitigate the adverse
effects of export subsidies. Export subsidies of any type are detrimental to food
security in developing countries in several aspects. First, access to food might be
limited as a result of low incomes. The import surges caused by the export
subsidies reduce farmers' domestic market share. The increase of imports leads to
91
a decrease in local production, which is provided mostly by smallholder farms.
Losses in domestic market share substantially reduce the incomes in rural regions;
consequently, households in those areas might not afford the food bills. Although
imports can produce downward pressure on agricultural products, this tendency
does not necessarily compensate the loss of incomes. Furthermore, the developing
countries that depend on their exports of agricultural products would suffer from
the price reductions caused by export subsidies.92 The increased food price would
also benefit NFIDCs in the long term because substituting imports with domestic
93
produce would be economical, thereby causing domestic production to increase.
Second, export subsidies enable the exporting countries, most of which are
developed countries, to dump leftovers in developing countries. 94 The doubtful
nutritional quality of imported food raises concerns for the utilization of food. The
AoA provides little leverage if any, for developing countries to counter the
problem of export subsidies. It cannot require the WTO to prohibit export
subsidies because the export subsidies are permissible under a certain level. Nor
can developing countries rely on their own export subsidies because they cannot
afford the expenditures. Even if they could, the permissible amounts of export
87. GATT Secretariat, supra note 68, at Annex 8, 5(a).
88. Id. 15.
89. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 9(1).
90. Id. at art. 10.
91. James Thuo Gathii, Food Sovereignty for Poor Countries in the Global Trading System, 57
Loy. L. REv. 509, 526-27 (2011).
92. Mark Ritchie & Kristin Dawkins, WTO Foodand AgriculturalRules: SustainableAgriculture
and the Human Right to Food,9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 24 (2000).
93. See Tashi Kaul, The Elimination of Export Subsidies and the Future of Net-Food Importing
Developing Countries in the WTO, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 383, 398 (2000).
94. Ritchie & Dawkins, supra note 94, at 16-17; OECD, Global FoodSecurity, supra note 24, at
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subsidies would be modest because they have granted almost no subsidies during
the base years, 95 and therefore the base for calculation is low or equal to zero.
Regarding the stability of food, the requirements of export subsidies are too
strict for developing countries to manage public stockholding schemes. In the case
of a high level of stock, governments prefer to sell the stocks to save the
expenditures of keeping it. 96 However, they are unlikely to do so to avoid
substantial price reductions in the domestic market that might lead to a decrease in
production in the long term. 97 According to the AoA, they also cannot export the
stocks at prices lower than the domestic level, 98 which might be higher than the
international level because of public stockholding schemes. Some
developing
99
countries encounter difficulties in disposing the surplus of stocks.
C. Domestic supports
It is widely agreed that domestic support can distort trade. However, instead
of prohibiting domestic supports, the AoA requires members to reduce domestic
supports to a certain extent. 100 The amount of domestic supports is expressed as
the aggregate measurement of supports ("AMS"), which is considered trade
distorting and is called "amber box subsidies."' 01 A developed country is obliged
to reduce twenty percent of its total AMS during the base period (1986-1988) over
six years, whereas a developing country is obliged to reduce it by fourteen percent
10 2
over ten years.
The precise amount of reduction is provided in the member's
03
schedule.'
Four types of domestic supports can be exempted from the AMS and thereby
free from the obligation of reduction. The first type is exemptions particularly for
developing countries. Developing countries are allowed to provide domestic
support for agricultural and rural development, investment subsidies, input
subsidies for poor producers, and diversification from growing illicit narcotic
crops. 10 4 The second type is known as the "blue box," which covers direct
payment under production-limiting programs. 10 5 The third exemption is the de
minimis threshold. For developing countries, the threshold for product-specific
subsidies is five percent of the total value of the production of subsidized
products. 10 6 In the case of non-product specific subsidies, the threshold is five
95. FAO, Implementation ofAoA, supranote 83, at § 2.3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Tashi Kaul, supranote 93, at 397.
99. FAO, Implementation ofAoA, supra note 83, at § 2.3.
100. AoA, supranote 4, at art. 6(1).
101. Agriculture Negotiations:BackgroundFact Sheet, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/agric_e/agboxese.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) [hereinafter
Agriculture Negotiations].
102. GATT Secretariat, supra note 68,
5, 8, 11, & 15.
103. AoA, supra note 4, at art. l(h)(i).
104. Id.art. 6(2).
105. Id. art. 6(5); Agriculture Negotiations,supra note 101.
106. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 6(4)(a)(i).
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percent of the value of the total agricultural production in the subsidizing
country.10 7 The threshold for developing countries is ten percent of the value of
their individual total agricultural production.10 8 The fourth type of reduction-free
domestic support is enumerated in Annex 2 of the AoA, which is referred to as
"green box" subsidies.109
Domestic supports are not always detrimental to food security. They could be
as harmful as export subsidies are to the food security in developing countries if
the subsidized product exports or the imports from developing countries must
compete with those that are subsidized. By contrast, the domestic supports for
agricultural R&D and rural development are beneficial to developing countries in
food availability and food access.'" From the perspective of developing countries,
the AoA limits their policy space on subsidies but cannot efficiently reduce the
subsidies in developed countries. First, the developed countries seemed to design
the requirements of domestic support so that they can maintain existing subsidies
to the maximum."' For instance, the blue box subsidies are used mostly by
developed countries and they account for a large portion of the domestic
supports. 12 Developing countries must still contend with problems caused by
heavily subsidized products. Second, the domestic supports in the green box
probably are not less trade distorting and neutral for production as they are
required to be. In addition, numerous developing countries have limited financial
ability to provide such supports, whereas developed countries avoid their reduction
obligation through the green box. It might be desirable for developing countries to
clarify, and perhaps tighten, the definition of supports in the green box.' Third,
many developing countries cannot use de minimis threshold for the amber box
subsidies, which are defined in Article 6 but do not fall within the blue or green
box, because they did not claim domestic supports during the base period." 4 In
other words, they cannot grant domestic supports in excess of the de minimis
level.1 5 Finally, the domestic supports of developing countries easily exceed the
de minimis level because they have high inflation rate and the baseline AMS is
calculated based on fixed prices during 1986-1988. 116 The depreciation of
exchange rates further aggravates the problem." 7 From the perspective of
developing countries, the AoA increases the negative aspects of domestic supports.

107. Id.
108. Id at art. 6(4)(b).
109. AgricultureNegotiations,supra note 101.
110. See supra Part II.

111. See Gonzalez, supranote 82, at 455.
112. See id at 464.
113. See PaperNo. 4, supranote 78, 18.
114. See Panos Konandreas & Jim Greenfield, Policy Optionsfor DevelopingCountries to Support
Food Security in the Post-UruguayRound Period, 15 CANADIAN J. OF DEV. STUD. 141, 149 (1998).
115. See PaperNo. 4, supranote 78, 14.
116. GATT Secretariat, supra note 68, 8.
117. SeePaperNo. 4, supranote 78, § 2.2.
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D. Export restrictions
The GATT exempts the export restrictions "temporarily applied to prevent or
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs" ' 1 8 from the obligations of quantitative
restrictions. Regarding shortage of foodstuffs at the domestic level, an intuitive
solution is to restrict exports if the food production cannot satisfy the short-term
demands. However, export restrictions cannot always help the domestic market to
meet food demands. Export restrictions are effective only if the productions of the
country with the restrictions can meet the demands, and if that country is a medium
or large economy.1 9 Furthermore, the export restrictions implemented by a large
economy can cause a price surge that will affect other countries. 120 Studies have
shown that export restrictions amplified the price increase in food crises.' 2 ' To
are therefore responsible for the distrust in relying
some extent, export restrictions
22
food availability on trade.'
Export restrictions are detrimental to food availability and increase price
volatility in food crises. Export restrictions have substantial implication on food
security in both developed and developing countries. The optimal option is to ban
such restrictions. The shortage in food can
23 be countered by direct and targeted
people.'
vulnerable
financially
for
supports
E. NFIDC decision
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the negotiators were concerned that the
reform required by the AoA could have negative effects on least-developed
countries and NFIDCs. They worried that the reform would increase the prices of
basic foodstuffs and that the food aid would decrease simultaneously. In other
words, the concern was the availability of basic foodstuffs from external resources
on reasonable conditions and terms.124 To respond to the concerns, the NFIDC
decision provides four mechanisms: (1) food aid, (2) short-term financing of
normal levels of commercial imports, (3) favorable terms for agricultural export
credits, and (4) technical and financial assistance in improving agricultural
productivity and infrastructure. 125 All these mechanisms can substantially
security. However, the NFIDC decision was not implemented
contribute to food
26
satisfactorily. 1
In summary, the WTO rules have positive and negative effects on food
118. GATT, art. XI (2)(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 1-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
119. Antoine Boudt & David Laborde Debucquet, The Economics of Export Taxes in the Context
of Food Crisis, in ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON RAW MATERIALS 59, 62-63

(OECD, 2010).
120 Id. at 65.
121. Id. at 67-72.
122. See Price Volatility, supra note 48, 25.
123. See id.
124. See Decision on Measures, supranote 65, 2
125. Christine Kaufmann & Simone Heri, Liberalizing Trade in Agriculture and Food SecurityMission Impossible?, 40 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1039, 1047 (2007).
126. Id. at 1048.
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security as a result of compromises among members. The implementations of the
market access are criticized to favor developed countries. Compared with
developed countries, developing countries have adopted an open attitude toward
imports. Developed countries should provide adequate market access. Otherwise,
developing countries will continue to be disadvantaged and therefore lose the
opportunity to increase incomes from exports. Export subsidies of any type are
clearly detrimental to the food security in developing countries. Export subsidies
should be prohibited in any event. Regarding the stability of food, the
requirements of export subsidies should provide additional policy space for
developing countries to manage public stockholding schemes. Domestic supports
are not always detrimental to food security. From the perspective of developing
countries, the AoA limits their subsidies but cannot efficiently reduce the subsidies
in developed countries. The situation should be changed. Export restrictions are
detrimental to food availability and increase the price volatility in food crises.
Export restrictions should be banned. The NFIDC decision provides mechanisms
that can substantially contribute to food security. Implementation of the decision
should be improved.
Iv. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BALI DECISIONS TO FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

The rules for the trade in agriculture are incomplete and the negotiations must
continue as instructed in Article 20 of AoA. The Doha Ministerial Declaration
provided that the members commit themselves to improving market access,
removing all forms of export subsidies, and reducing trade-distorting domestic
support. 127 In addition, the members committed to provide developing countries
special and different treatments that enable them to address the concerns of food
security and rural development.' 28 In the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the
members reiterated the goals of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and further
clarified the approaches. Regarding domestic supports, the members agreed that
129
members with higher levels of permitted support should have more reductions.
Regarding export subsidies, members committed to ensure the elimination of
export subsidies by the end of 2013.130 There were promises for tariff cuts. The
developing countries were granted the "flexibility to self-designate an appropriate
number of tariff lines as Special Products guided by indicators based on the criteria
of food security, livelihood security and rural development." 131 They were
promised to "have the right to have recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism
based on import quantity and price triggers, with precise arrangements to be
further defined."' 132 Because the "draft modality" failed to be adopted in 2008, the
127. See Haberli, supra note 8, at 4.
128. See id
129. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005,
[hereinafter Doha Work Programme].
130. Id. 6.
131. Id. 7.
132. Id.

5, WT/MN(05)/DEC/1,

(2005)
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progress for developing countries seemed to diminish.
Despite the setbacks, the developing countries continued to mention concerns
in the negotiations on agriculture. 133 The developing countries are in groups and
submitted the G-33 proposal1 34 and G20 proposals, 135 which were the basis for
discussion and were partially adopted in the Bali Package. The issues discussed
are the tariff-rate quota ("TRQ") administration, green box exemptions, and further
restrictions on export subsidies. The critical concern in this section is whether the
Bali decisions can contribute to food security as expected by developing countries.
A.

Market access

For food security, market access should be available to developing countries
because the increase of exports can increase incomes, thereby ensuring access to
food. No commitments were made to grant increased market access, except the
soft appeal for improvement as provided in the Ministerial Decision on Duty-Free
and Quota-Free Market Access for Least Developed Countries. Developed
countries and some developing countries are not obliged but encouraged to provide
duty-free and quota-free market access to least-developed countries, as they have
committed, before the next Ministerial Conference. 136 Regarding agricultural
products, the members did not commit to providing further tariff concession;
instead, the focus was on the "fill rates" of tariff quota. When the tariff quota is
under-filled with no apparent commercial reason, the members shall relocate the
unused tariff quota to the holders who would actually import. 13' The Bali
decisions have accomplished little in increasing market access. The problems of
the implementation of the AoA remain unsolved.
B. Export subsidies
Export subsidies are detrimental to food security because the artificially low
prices as a result of export subsidies decrease the incomes of farmers and
discourage investments in agriculture. There was a proposed deadline for the
elimination of export subsidies, which has been expired and for that the members
showed some regrets. 138 The Declaration on Export Competition attempted to
133. See generally Biswajit Dhar & Roshan Kishore, Prospectsof the Bali Ministerial Conference
(working paper for Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade) (Nov. 2013),
http://www.ris.org.in/images/R1S_images/pdf/wpl 3613.pdf.
134. See generally Committee on Agricultural Special Session, G-33 Non-Paper, JOB/AG/25 (Oct.
3, 2013) [hereinafter G-33 Non-Paper].
135. See generally Committee on Agricultural Special Session, Ministerial Decision of 21 April
2013, JOB/AG/24, (2013), http://www.onuperu.org/wto/wto/g20_2.pdf [hereinafter Duty-Free and
Quota-Free, April 2013]; Committee on Agricultural Special Session, Ministerial Decision of 7
December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/39, WT/L/914 (2013) [hereinafter Understanding on Tariff Quota

Administration].
136. See WTO, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/44, WT/L/919 (2013)
[hereinafter Duty-Free and Quota-Free, December 2013]
137. Understanding on Tariff Rate Quota Administration, supra note 135, 9.
138. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN (13)/40, WT/L/915 2 (2013)

[hereinafter Export Competition].
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recover the efforts by including the draft modalities for agriculture as an
imperative basis for a final agreement.' 39 Increased commitment was made as "we
shall exercise utmost restraint with regard to any recourse to all forms of export
subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect.' 140 Hence, the members
agreed to eliminate the export subsidies, to keep the level of subsidies lower than
members' commitments on export subsidies and to discipline use of all export
measures with equivalent effect of export subsidies. 141 The members also
committed to enhance transparency and monitor
export subsidies. Furthermore,
142
they agreed to discuss the concerns annually.
Although some progress seems to have been made, the commitments are
superficial rather than substantial. In the final paragraph of this decision, the
members emphasized that the terms of this declaration do not affect members'
rights and obligations. 143 Nor shall they be used to interpret their rights and
obligations. In other words, the constraints on export subsidies depend on the
good will of the members; which might be unpractical. The members could have
inserted stronger obligation in the declaration if they had intended to reduce or
eliminate export subsidies.
C. Domestic supports: Green box exemptions
Domestic support has both positive and negative impacts on food security.
The subsidies for R&D, rural development, and risk management mechanism can
improve productivity, increase incomes, and increase stability, all of which
contribute to food security at national and at global levels. 144 However, subsidies
on products or price supports distort the market and are as harmful as export
subsidies. The Bali Package contains two decisions concerning the green box
exemptions, which are described as the triumph of developing countries for food
security. 145 This observation is true according to the Ministerial Decision on
General Services. The members clarified that the list of general service programs
provided in paragraph two of Annex 2 in the AoA is only illustrative. 146 The list
includes programs related to land reforms and rural livelihood security for rural
development and poverty alleviation. 147 This decision could provide substantial
flexibility for developing countries to fulfill the policy suggestions proposed by the
FAO, which are known as the "twin-track approach"' 148 for alleviating hunger
139. Id. 3.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. 8.
Id.
Id. 10-1.
Id. 13
See supraPart II
See, e.g., Historic WTO Deal on India's Terms, Food Security StandPrevails,NDTV, Dec. 7,

2013, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/historic-wto-deal-on-indias-terms-food-security-stand-prevails543628.
146. See WTO, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN (13)/37, WT/L/912 (2013)
[hereinafter General Service].
147. See generally, id.
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combined with sustainable agricultural and rural development with targeted
programs for enhancing direct access to food for the most needy. This could also
satisfy the measures for risk management tools used to increase the resilience to
price volatility and the shortage of supply. If the term "rural livelihood security"
could be interpreted to allow increased policy flexibility, the decision could
substantially harmonize the potential conflicts between disciplines on domestic
supports and the need for food security.
Optimism should not be excessive regarding the potential achievements of the
Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purpose. This
decision altered no existing rules provided in the AoA. The public food
stockholding program for food security purposes are obligated to follow the
criteria set forth in Annex 2 as well as its footnotes, particularly the procurement
price at the current market price. 149 However, the advantages of the public food
stockholding programs are derived from a higher and more predictable price than
that available in the open market. By providing a higher price, farmers can obtain
increased incomes and are therefore encouraged to invest in the improvement of
production. 150 The implication of paragraph two would be that developing
countries might exceed their AMS ceilings, which are low, as a result of the public
food stockholding programs. The ministerial decision provides only the "peace
clause,"' 5 1 which provides developing countries a four-year time out, expiring on
the eleventh ministerial conference, for exemption from the dispute settlement
challenges. 152 A public food stocking program is eligible for the peace clause, if it
is notified to the Committee of Agriculture with the required information, meets
the requirements in Annex 2, and does not distort trade and adversely affect the
food security of other members. 153
Comparing this ministerial decision with the G-33 proposal, the peace clause
seems to be agreeable for developing countries. The members agreed only to
refrain from bringing the claim before the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). If
any member insists to raise a claim, the DSB has no choice but to commence the

measures for establishing resilient food systems. Factors that affect food system resilience include the
structure of the food economy as a whole, as well as its components such as agricultural production,
technology, the diversification of food processing, markets and consumption. [The second track]
assesses the options for providing support to vulnerable groups." FAO, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 18,
at 3.
149. WTO, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, 2, WT/MIN (13)/38, WT/L/913 (2013)
[hereinafter Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes].
150. See Christophe Bellmann et al., G-33 Proposal:EarlyAgreement on Elements of The Draft
Doha Accord to Address FoodSecurity, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INFORMATION NOTE, 1, 4 (Sept. 2013),
http://www.ictsd.org/themes/agriculture/research/g-33-proposal-early-agreement-on-elements-of-thedraft-doha-accord-to.
151. G-33 Non-paper, supra note 136, at 2.
152. See FAO, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 18.
153. G-33 Non-paper, supra note 136; Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, supra note
149, 2-4.
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procedures. 154 Furthermore, it might be difficult for the public stockholding
programs to fulfill all the conditions for the peace clause. They have a large
possibility of either distorting trade or affecting the food security of others in a free
trade market.1 55 A more constructive statement is the promise to commence a
Working program that strives for a permanent solution for public stockholding.
The implication of the public food stockholding on food security is still under
56
debate, and further discussion is warranted. 1
V. CONCLUSION

Some policy orientations can increase food security in developing countries.
Developing countries can contribute to the food availability by investing in
agricultural R&D, general infrastructure, education, and the preservation of arable
lands. Similar to the improvement of food availability, investments in the
agricultural sector can increase incomes and therefore secure access to food. The
social security net is a complement that can support access to food in the short
term. To utilize trade for food security, recommendations include reducing import
barriers and trade-distorting domestic supports and prohibiting all export subsidies.
Regarding utilization of food, the cost-effective and efficiency options are
nutrition-specific interventions such as information and education programs, the
provision of health care services, and clean water and sanitation infrastructures.
The WTO rules have positive and negative effects on food security as result
of compromises among the members. The implementations of the market access
are criticized to favor developed countries. Compared with developed countries,
developing countries have adopted an open attitude toward imports. Developed
countries should provide adequate market access. Otherwise, developing countries
will continue to be disadvantaged and therefore lose the opportunity to increase
incomes from exports. Export subsidies of any type are clearly detrimental to the
food security in developing countries. Export subsidies should be prohibited.
Regarding the stability of food, the requirements of export subsidies should
provide increased flexibility for developing countries to manage public
stockholding schemes. Domestic supports are not always detrimental to food
security. From the perspective of developing countries, the AoA limits their
subsidies but cannot efficiently reduce the subsidies in developed countries. The
situation should be changed.
Export restrictions are detrimental to food
availability and increase the price volatility in food crises. Export restrictions
should be banned. The NFIDC decision provides mechanisms that could
substantially contribute to food security. However, implementation of the decision
should be improved.
The Bali decisions and declarations have made some but limited progress in
regards to food security. The Bali decisions have accomplished little in increasing

154. See FAO, TRADE REFORM, supra note 10, at 9.

155. See Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, supra note 149, at 6.
156. FAO, The Bali Package-Implicationsfor Trade and Food Security, FAO Trade Policy
Briefs No. 16, http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/i3658e/i3658e.pdf.
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market access; therefore, no improvement of incomes can be expected in the rural
areas of developing countries. The problems of the implementation of the AoA
remain unsolved. Regarding export subsidies, there seems to be some progress,
but the commitments are superficial rather than substantial. Regarding domestic
supports, developing countries have obtained the advantage by extending the green
box exemptions for rural development and poverty alleviation. Optimism should
not be excessive regarding the potential achievements of the Ministerial Decision
on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purpose, because the peace clause might
not have substantial function. In summary, developing countries have gained
progress but remain disadvantaged. In general, the Bali decisions and declaration
regarding agriculture are repeating the past agreements and promises to work on
for a balance between trade and food security. It seems too early for developing
countries to feel safe about food security.

